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In addition to meeting the continuing threat
of new and reemerging infectious diseases, public
health officials must also prepare for the possible
use of infectious agents as weapons by terrorists
to further personal or political agendas. These
were the conclusions of session panelists Scott
Lillibridge, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC); Michael Skeels, Oregon State
Public Health Laboratory; Marcelle Layton, New
York City Department of Public Health; David
Franz, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases; and Randall Murch, Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
The potential spectrum of bioterrorism
ranges from hoaxes and use of non–mass casualty
devices and agents by individuals and small
groups to state-sponsored terrorism that employs
classic biological warfare agents and can produce
mass casualties. The agents of anthrax, plague,
brucellosis, smallpox, viral encephalidites, and
viral hemorrhagic fevers are of particular
concern: they are relatively easy and inexpensive
to produce, cause death or disabling disease, and
can be aerosolized and distributed over large
geographic areas. If released under ideal
environmental circumstances, these agents can
infect hundreds of thousands of persons and
cause many deaths. Such scenarios would
present serious challenges for patient manage-
ment and for prophylaxis of exposed persons;
environmental contamination could provide a
continuing threat to the population (especially
those exposed at the beginning of the crisis) and
generate panic in the community.
Bioterrorist attacks could be covert or
announced and could be caused by virtually any
pathogenic microorganism. The case of the
Rajneeshee religious cult in The Dalles, Oregon,
is an example (1). The cult planned to infect
residents with Salmonella on election day to
influence the results of county elections. To
practice for the attack, they contaminated salad
bars at 10 restaurants with S. Typhimurium on
several occasions before the election. A
communitywide outbreak of salmonellosis re-
sulted; at least 751 cases were documented in a
county that typically reports fewer than five
cases per year. Although bioterrorism was
considered a possibility when the outbreak was
being investigated by public health officials, it
was considered unlikely. The source of the
outbreak became known only when FBI
investigated the cult for other criminal viola-
tions. A vial of S. Typhimurium identical to the
outbreak strain was found in a clinical laboratory
on the cult’s compound, and members of the cult
subsequently admitted to contaminating the
salad bars and putting Salmonella into a city
water supply tank. This incident, among other
recent events, underscores the importance of
improving preparedness at all levels.
A bioterrorist attack may be difficult to
distinguish from a naturally occurring infectious
disease outbreak. Investigators must first
examine the etiology and epidemiology of an
outbreak to identify its source, mode of
transmission, and persons at risk. Certain clues
may indicate whether an outbreak is the result of
purposeful release of microorganisms. Naturally
occurring diseases are endemic to certain areas
and involve traditional cycles of transmission;
some diseases occur seasonally, and sentinel
cases are not uncommon. In contrast, a disease
outbreak due to bioterrorism could occur in a
nonendemic-disease area, at any time of year,
without warning, and depending on the etiologic
agent and mode of transmission, in large
numbers—thousands of cases might occur
abruptly. Public health officials must be
appropriately sensitized to the possibility of
bioterrorism when investigating disease out-
breaks. Suspected bioterrorism should be
reported promptly to FBI, which is responsible
for coordinating interagency investigations of
such episodes. FBI scientists are also well trained
in forensic methods for criminal investigations
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and are prepared to react quickly and effectively.
Maintaining effective disease surveillance is
an essential first step in preparedness and is
important in helping law enforcement officials to
react swiftly. Ensuring adequate epidemiologic
and laboratory capacity nationwide are prerequi-
sites to effective surveillance systems. Prepara-
tions also must include plans for rapid
identification and characterization of agents
involved and for emergency distribution of large
quantities of medical supplies, especially antibi-
otics and vaccines. Coordination and communica-
tion links also need to be strengthened to
minimize response time, especially at first when
exposed but asymptomatic persons may still be
treated prophylactically. Also, when response
time is shortened, the possibility of apprehending
perpetrators increases. Education and training
in bioterrorism and its potential consequences
must become national priorities.
Many agencies and organizations must work
collaboratively to ensure national preparedness
against bioterrorist attacks. CDC is well
positioned to provide leadership in several areas.
In partnership with state health departments,
the agency maintains infectious disease surveil-
lance systems and provides reference laboratory
diagnosis and epidemiologic support, especially
during outbreak investigations; disseminates
public health recommendations and other
information, issues quarantine measures, and
provides expert advice on worker health and safety;
and is the logical bridge between the public health
community and FBI’s scientific and response
capabilities. Enhancing the public health infra-
structure will improve U.S. ability to respond to
any infectious disease outbreak and provide
added value in the event of a bioterrorist event.
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